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In this paper c~e develop a theoretical framework which tuakes it possible to an-
alyze several aspect, of convergence between E.C. countries. The analysis is done
in a dynauuc game context, where countries, apart from minimizing individual cost
functions, minimize cooperatively a convergence fitnction, which represents the con-
vergence conditions which are elaborated in the h4aastricht treaty (1991). The aspect
of convergence is modelecl as a dynamic constraint on the incliviclual cost functíons.
~Ve show that the maximnw degree of convergence is completely determined by the
non-cooperativP ontcome of the gawe. The framework is illustrated in a theoretical
example. The esatnple shows that: (1) the goals with respect to convergence can
seriously inflneuce the outcome of the gante. If these goals are set too ambitious the
outcome can be that counhies are uot willing to cooperate anymore. (2) the costs
involced to obtaiu concergence can cliffer substantially between countries. (3) a mi-
nor deviation 5oui a ParPto optimal solution can increase convergence considerably.
An algorithm is clevisecl how to obtain solntions of the gatne which are politically
more feasible thau the :~ash bargaiuing solution and iwprove on the non-cooperative
solution.
'This research was sponsorerl by the Economics Research Foundation, which is part of the Netherlands
Organization for Scieutific Research (NWO).
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1 Introduction
Due to the integration process withiu the E.C. countries there is an increasing demand for
price stability. To that end the European Council decided, at the Maastricht meeting in
1991, to start, at least in 1999, with irreversibl}. fixed exchange rates and to establish a Eu-
ropean Central Bank. This fiual step towards the realization of the E,ti1U sets out, however,
that uneven developmeuts in the process of iutegratiou are set aside. Therefore, greater
convergence of ecouonuc performance is ueeded (see the report of Delors Committee (3~).
Another aspect oi the integration process ís that as a cousequence of the strengthened
economic interdepenclence between member countries the room for independent policy
manoeuvre is reduced aud that cross-border effects of developments originating in eacó
member couutry become more and more important. So, the stages towards an economic
and monetary wiion involve on the one hand a process of closer convergence, and on the
other hand coordination of the macroeconomic policies of the various countries. Important
to note is that this of cowse does uot imply that if there is convergence of economic policies
and~or coordiuatiou of ~uacroeconomic policies between countries, the integration process
will be balanced aud thus the establishmeut of a single market is justified. In other words
convergence aud coordiuation are prerequisites for obtaining a siugle market but don't
guarantee a succesful establishmeut of it. Now, there is a general consensus amongst the
participating countries that convergence and coordination of policies is needed for moving
towards an ecouomic and mouetary union. There is, however, much less consensus how far
and how fast this process should take place. This has, of course, everything to do with the
internal forces working on the markets of each individual country. The possibly long run
significant increases in economic wrlfare iu the C'ommunity are much less tangible than the
short tenn welfare loa effects incurred at various domestic markets. Therefore, a natural
reaction one can expect from participating countries is that they do strive for convergence
in economic variables, hut that chPy are ouly williug to pa}~ a price (iu tenns of welfare loss)
for it if the additional increase in the degree of couvergeuce will be significant. Studies
with respect to macroecouoiuic policy coordination iu a dynainic games context appear
frequently in Pconomic literature, see e.g. Brandsma ['?[, Aicl~ibbiu and Sachs [6[, Hughes
Hallet [4~. However, the iuHueuce of the aspects of convergence, analysed in a dynamic
ga~ues setting, on the effects of macroecouuuuc policy coordination are not studied before.
This motivates the stuciy of this paper.
Starting from the point of vie~~~ that each country has its own inclividual welfare loss func-
tion it wants to miuimize in cooperation with the other countries, we develop a theoretical
framework to aualyze the trade off between extra welfare loss and more couvergeuce. The
analysis will be doue iu a dyuaiuic games framework. ~~'e assume that each policymaker
has an individual objective function, he~s6e wauts to miuiuuze and that there is some com-
mon sense ou a convrrgence fuuction which they want to miuimize simultaneously. In the
case of the E~1L' this convergeuce function iuay e.g. represent the convergence conditions
which are specified in the 1laastricht treaty (1991). [u particular the two conditions of
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convergence in consumer price inflation and convergence in long term interest rates that are
necessary for admittiug a country to the mouetary union (see e.g. Bean (1~) can be incor-
porated in such a functiou. L?nder the assumption that all policytnakers like to cooperate,
we analyze the set of solutions which are obtained by the policymakers when they simul-
taneously miuimize their welfare loss functions and convergettce function. We assume that
the degree of convergPnce. which is represented by the value of the convergence function,
depends on the agreenwuts of the outcome of a negotiating process between countries. In
particular we will show that if reducing welfare loss is the pritnary interest of countries, the
degree of cottvergence countries can obtain is limited. So, if countries strive for a degree of
convergence which is set too antbitious, the result can be that (some) countries will show
non-cooperative behaviour. In a theoretical example we illustrate two additional aspects
the game may have.
(1) The price (in tenns of índivic{ual welfare loss) that countries have to pay will for some
countries be higher than for other countries.
(2) There are situatious in which by a ntiuor deviation from the Pareto solution, a large
increase in convergeuce degree is possible. ht other words, by paying a small price (in
terms of individual welfare loss) high reveuues (in terms of convergence) can be obtained.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section two we will introduce the theoretical
framework. We consider !~' countries which cooperatively agree on ttunirttizing a conver-
gence function and, moreover, all have their own individual objective function they like
to nunimize. The aspect of convergence is modeled as a dynamic constraint on the joint
social welfare functiou. ['nder the assuntption that all of these functions are convex and
(some nuld regularity conditious) we show the above mentioned aspects. Furthermore we
show that thP cooperativP untcumP wich yields the largest degree of convergence coincides
w'ith the `ash solution of thP ganle. Tu help the reader to undPrstand the basics of the pre-
seuted theory we illustratP the appruach in section three by tueans of a simple theoretical
example. In section fOUr wP prPSPIIL ChP COnCIUSIOnS.
2 Incorporating convergence criteria: a theoretical
framework
~1e consider an integrated Prouumy of the Ewopeau Community with iti- interdependent
PCUIlUl111eS, WI]PI'P thP policyntakPrs in each country face a dynamic economi.c model which
connects the eudogeuous variablPS (dPUOtPd by y), instrumental variables (denoted by u)
and other noncuntrollable variables. Each country has control over a set of instruments
fur economic policy, denotPd b}' u,. In stacked fonn u' -(u~,...,u,ti.). We assume that
each policymaker has a convex objective functiou, which we specify by J„ which he~she
wants to ntinintize. ~~e deuote the set of Pareto optimal solutions in the Jt,...,JN-plane
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by P. The point . ti', correspouds to the non-cooperative ( Nash) solution, which is used as
a bargaining threat-point, deuoted by N` :- (J~ ,..., JN ). Furthermore we assume that
the countries agree to strive for a certain amount of degree of convergence for some of their
economic ( endogenous and~or instrumental) variables. This agreement will be reflected
in a convex convergence fuuctiou, denoted by C, which is included in the optimization
process. It is importaut to stress that the convergence function differs from the countries
objective functious in a way that the latter contains only variables which belong to its own
country whereas the convergence fuuction contains variables of all the countries. Thus
mininuzing a costfunctiou is something that cau, in principle, be done by a country alone
whereas nunimiziug the convergence functiou has to be doue simultanously.
The decision-making process of the policymakers coucerning what strategy to follow, will
depend ou the followiug set:
{(J,(u),...,J,v(u),C'(u)) ~ u E U}, (1)
where we suppose that the strategy-space U is a convex set. The policymakers have to find
a cooperative strategy which results in a point in ( 1) which is acceptable for them all. Now
note that whenever two differeut strategies }'ield the same individual costs J;, i- 1, ..., N,
but different values for the couvergence function, only the strategy yielding the lowest value
for the convergence fuuction is of interest to all policymakers. So, the set of relevant control
strategies consists of:
(~ -{u E U ~`du E U (.It(u)....,J.v(u)) -(Jt(u),...,JN(u)) ~ C(u) G C(u)}.
This observation tnakes it possiblr to consider the decision problem from the following
point of vietv. By var} iug tbe strategies over the whole set U, we obtain the set of all
possible objective outcomes in the Jt, .., J,v~-plane. To each point in this set is attached
a unique value for tlte rouvergence functiun. The problem for the decision makers is now
to select cooperativel~- a puint within this set that is acceptable for everyone. Now, as
mentioued in the íutruduction we will assnme that minimizing their own cost function is
the primary iuterest uf ~uuntries and that striving for convergence is of secundary interest.
In that case the aspPCt of couvergence acts as a dynamic constraiut on joint social welfare.
If we, furthermure, refraiu frum the possibility of side-paymeuts aud asswne that the axiom
of individual rationalit}~ holds (see e.g. (i] t), theu countries will cooperatively minimize
the joint convergeuce fuuction as luug as their iudividual costs will be lower than their
non-cooperative custs. Su, the set of possible objective outcomes will then restricted on
the one hand 6~ thr nun-ruuperative ~1ash threatpoint !Y`, aud on the other hand by the
set of Pareto solutions. ~~'e will call this set in the sequel the negotiation area (see figure
1 for an illustratiou iu a twu player coutext). The basic question is now of course, how
we can detennine this uegotiation area and its corresponding convergence function values
~This axiom states that policymakers, if they behave rational, will never accept an outeome for their
individual object fimction which is worse than the one a policymaker can obtain by acting independently




- - negotiation area N
Figure l: RepresPntatiou of the uegotiatiou area in a two player context.
in an efficient way. We will uot give a complete answer to this question, but present a
solution which we expect will work fur the applications we are ainung at (i.e. situations in
which the set of Paretu-solutions and the Nash-threatpoint are situated not too far from
each other). ThP solutiun w~e will presrnt has a number of nice properties. First of all
ít attaches to PvPry puint in the urgotiatiun area a unique control strategy that can be
obtained by minimiziug a strict convex cotnbiuation of the individual object functions and
the convergence fuuction. Secoudly, we will show that this control strategy is parametri2ed
b~ :~' parameters and that this parametrization is a coutiuuous function of its parameters.
By varying the parameters between 0 aud 1, the whole nrgotiation area can then be covered
(in general (see uote ahove)).
The solution is motivatecl b~ oitr a~aumptiuu that each policymaker is primarily interested
in nunimizing his ow~u objectivr fuuc[iun in a cooperative setting aud that convergence plays
a nunor role. ~~'e model this aspect by rew~riting the couvex coutbiuation of individual cost
and convetgence cost iu a special wa}~. Cunsiiler




This is equivalent with (in the non-trivial casP RN~t ~ 1):
(1 - a)(atJt f... t ~,v-JN) f aC`. whece ~- àN tt, and ct~ -~~~(1 - Q,vtt),
which has the nice property that ~~-t a, - 1. If we miuimize this second convex combi-
nation of the individual object functions aud the couvergence function then we have the
property that ~- 0 resetnbles the case that countries completely ignore the convergence
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Gual land Lrcausr ~~~-~ rt, - 1 wP fiud ChP Pareto optimal solutions), and that ~- 1
conPSpond~ ~cith thr ra~r that countries only pay attention to their mutual convergence
iuterests. ~~'e wil] sho~c ( uniler some smoothuess couditions) that the set of cooperative
optimal strategirs correspouding with these adapted object functions for each of the N
cuuiitrirs, can he parametrized by the :N - 1 parameters at,...,aN-t and a, and that this
},aramrtrizatiou is a coutiuuous differentiable function of all these parameters. By varying
thrsP paramrtrrs, in particular a, it is then possible to analyze the trade off between the
cu~ts indi~idual countrirs have to pay and more convergence. First, we present a prelim-
inar~ rr~ult. ThP nrXi IhPOiPll] ShOWS that if one considers a certain convex combination
of all object functiouals J„ i- 1,..,.v aud C, the optimal strategy minimizing this
combination will bP a routinuous differentiable function of N out of N~ 1 parameters.
Theorem 2.1 .S'uppo.~ l' iv a coni~rz ..r t, J,(u), i- 1, ..., N and C(u) are strictly convea
Jiiucttonals u,h:ch arf tirice continuous(y diJjerent:ab(e in u E U. Consider
r N
.1( u. n,...., aN. a) :- (1 -~) I ~ ct,J,(u)~ f 1C(u)
` -,
J~r u E(. a E[0, 1] and a, E[0, 1] Jor i- 1, ... , N, urith ~N ~ ct, - 1. Let
u' .- argu~inJ(tt,ctt,...,~N,a).
Thcrt. Jor rl~cry ~ E [0. 1] arid cr, E[0, 1] Jor i- 1,...,:V, with ~vt a; - 1, u' is uniquely
drlfrrninrd ac a Juurtior~ oJ thr paramctcra a,,...,ctN-t,a, i.e. u' - u'(a,,...,ah~-t,a).
.llr,rrnrrr, this Junction u' i.. a coriiinuous(~ diffcrentiab(e function in (at,...,a,v-,, ~) E
Í0. 1] x... x[0.1], irith ~~-~~ n; C 1.
Proof. Lrt r~ :- (~, ...., á~,~) E[0, 1] x... x[0, l] be fixed uumbers, with ~N ~ n; - 1. The
~trirtl~ ci,u~Px proprrties of J,....,.lv,(' imply that the functiou J(u) is strictly convex in
rr E(~. So for r~~rrv n. J lias a uuiq,iP gloLal miuitnum ou U. Denote this element in U,
n l,icli drpPnds on r~, hc u,;. SincP .1 is diffrrentiablP w'e conClUdP that the derivative of J
~cith rrsprct to u. r~aluatrd at thP point u~ is zero. So,
- ~)J(ul - t).1,(u) - - óJ,v(u) -dC(u)
a ci,~~.,~,u -(-,..... ): -(1-~)á, t...t(l-a)a,v fa -0t)u ~)u iju óu
e~aluateil at thr puíut u- u~. `otP that, siuce J is by assumption twice continuous
diffrrrntiablP, thr fuurtiuual F is contiu,rous differentiable in (a,, ..., ct,ti.-t, ~, u) E[0, 1] x
x'0. 1] x(. Furtl,rrnwrr, siucr J, ..... J,~ , C are strictly convex fuuctionals in u, we have
tliat
CÍF(CY, ll~)
dá E[0, 1] x... x[0, 1] det ~u ~ 0.
.~ppl~~ing the i~uplicit function theorem yiPlds then that there is an uuique continuous
differrntiable functiou. .ay J, such that for all ~:- (ttt, ..., a~r, ~) E(0, 1] x... x[0, 1],
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Fln. (In)I - U. ~~~itli ~(n) - u,,. tiu. u' :- u'(ot.....cr.~.,1) :- Í(at.....a,~.~) is a
cuutinuolls differentiai,le flturtiuu iu ~i E[U, 1] x... x[U. 1]. [~siug tlle fac[ tftat ~v t ct; - 1
gi~es u' - u'(al.....o~-l.,`). O
Rernark. In the seqn~~l ~~e ",ill llse tlle uutatiou (ctl....,a.,.-1) E[0, 1] x... x[0.1], but, by
cluing so. ~te implicitl~ a~~nme that tlle u,, i- I, .....~' - 1 tiatisfi~ tlle coustraint ~;-il t7, G
1. -
l'sing the pre~ iuus reatlt ~~e tibuw no~c tbat tóe set of ~~outrol stratPgiPS iiefined iu theorem
'?.1., parametrized l,~
- {u'(ol.....o~-l.~).~ (c~l.....o~--t.~) E [0.1] x ... x [0.1]}
has the adcertiseil f,ru~,erties. Furmall~~ tlle reslllt rea~ls as fullo~cs:
Theorem 2.2 Thr rt rri..l,~ a Gijcrtirt n,ap~iing bcttreera thr stt of urlique points
{u'(nl.....a~-1.,1) ~ (t~l.....n~.-1.,1) E [0.1] x ... x [0.1]}
nnd tht ,.ci
{(.Il(u'). ..l~lu').('(~t-)) ~ (ol.....cl,~-l.,`) E [0.1] x ... x [0.1]}.
FttrfhErmorF Jll u'1......1~(u').C'(u") ar~ rnnlinuott., fiturliort., trt (~1.....c~~-l.a) E[0, 1]x
... x [0. 1 ] .
Proof. Becatl~e 1I -,~)(~i-1 u,) t,1 - l. ~cith ,` E[0, 1] autl tZ, E[0, 1],for i- 1,...,.~~.
the uuique ~ollltiou tt' uf J(u) iti a Pau~etu suliltion fur tlle ohjecti~~e fuuc[ion J(u) ~~.hich
represeuts a galue ~~~itll .~ T ! placer~. ~cllere ettcb 1)Ia1'er II1111ll711ZP5 tlle objecti~-e function
reNreseutecl bc J, fur i,l~,~'er r. l i- I......`~) au~l C' fur f,la~er .`~ ~- l. .-~ccordiug to ,e.g.. de
Leeu~c [9. lemnla 3.-1.' ~ultl 3.~.:31 tllere is a bijrrti~e mapf~iuQ hrhti~een tlle Pareto solutions
for Jl......1~. (' an~l tlle uptilual ~ulutiun fur .l. Tlte ~et uf Pareto sulutions cau be found
b~ ~~aniuQ tlle flxrrlnlrtrrs ltll.....o~.,`) bri~ceeu [ll, 1] x... x[0. 1] rcith ~;~-t ct; - 1.
Because u' i~ a ruutillnulls fnnctiou in (n~.....c~~-1„~) E[0. I] x... x[0, 1] it is straightfor-
~card tbat Jllu'Íc~l.....o~-i.,1j)......1~.(u'(rll.....c~~-1.,~)).C-(u'(at.....n,~-l.~)) arecon-
tiuuuus fuuctiou. in Inl.....n~-1.,1) E[0. 1] x... x[0.1]. ~7
['~ing the tlleurem, tlle set uf runtrol ~trnte~ir, (~;i~~e. ns tlie fullu~cíug subset of (1):
{(J~(u'I......1~(u').C'(u')) I tt` E (~} l~~)
To aee tllat tbi~ rP~ln~ tiuu of the set in j I) still cunt~tius all tbe interesting poiuts. ~~.e aua-
l~ze tóe set iu ('?j iu ~unlhiuatiou ~eith J nwre sperificall~~. ~~~e lla~.e that:
(r) tbe ~et iu ('?) rontaíu. tlle ~chule ~rt uf puiuts (Jl......1~ ) ~,,~hicll bPlung to tlte Pareto
optimal solutions. Tu tiu~l these ;ultltiuus ~ce .nbstitiltr' ~- 0 in (- and fill in tlte resulting
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cuntrul titrategir, in I'~I.
I rr) tllr srt in f dl cunta,in~ thr t)uints ~shrrr (' is minimaL To finel these points ~ce substi-
tute a- 1 iu (~ anrl till Ilt tllr rr.ul[ill~ stratrgies in (1).
Furtltennorr, frum tlir~urrtn '?.1. ~cr Ita~'e tllat the srt uf points iu ('?) form a continuous
~urfacr iu thr Jt......1~.('-),laur. ~chirll indicates that ~~'e Ita~'r paratnetrized all the inter-
r~tiug 1)uiut. I,rt~crrn j,) .uul )rr) a~ ~~'rll. Thrsr poiuts can l,r fuuud hy' ~'ar}'iug ~ behveen
U ~,ucl l.
E~runt uu~e on ~~'e ~cill ~I:i), tltr u' iu tltr uotatiuu aurl ,Irscribe the srt in ('?) as:
{(Jt.....J~~.(~) ~ (t11.....ct~-t.~) E [U.1] x ... x [U.1]}. (3)
`~r ~cill nu~~' flrfiur ~utnr ~rt~ uf iutrrraitlg ) ,uiuts. .~ projrr-tion of tltr set iu (: 3), on tlte
Jt..... Js-plaur is:
ti:- {(.h......1~') I(f)I.....o.~-t.~) E[U.1~ x ... x~0.1~}
The subset of ti:
P :- {(.h......1~ ) ~i (rit.....n;~-t.0) E [U, 1~ x ... x (U, 1~}
rrt)resrnt~ tLr .rt uf Pr,rrtu .ul,ttiuus. I~u-rull~'rl'grnr'r liues, i.r. liues ~citll tlte satne degree
uf cun~'ergencr. are clrtinrrl ~ts fullo~~'~:
l, :- {IJt......1~) I('(r,t.....r~~-1.,~) - ~. (Jl......l~.) E ti'. 7 E IFi`}
`utr that a~mnll ~alnr ul -. rurn~.~,unrl, ~~'ith much cuu~'rrarncr ( anr{ ~'ice ~'ersa). The
ne~otiatiuu arra i~ rlrtinrrl I,~:
`:- {ÍJ~......1~)!.ll G.l~ ......1~ C.l~. (Jt.....J~)E ti}
l-~iuo thr ~,~iutn ut in,li~i~lual rltiun~,lit~ it i~ r'Irar tllrrt t)uli~~ntakrrs ~cill nut aQree to a
rrrtain ,Irgrrr ui run~rr„rnrr. ~Irur,l,~~l L~' -. iC I-, ~1.`~ - l~. `lurro~'rr. tllr largest drgree
uf cuu~'rrorucr t,ulir~ ln~tl:rr~ arr. ~cilliuo tr, .Irrrpt i. ~i~'ru L~':
- Iniu{-, ~ l, fl .",~} ~ 4~.
tiu, iu ~rneral polif~'m~rkrr~ .Ilultl,l ~rt tltr~ir ,Ir~rrr of cuu~'rt.oruce ~~'itll rarr hrcause if tltis
clr;rre i, srt tou atnhitio,l. pulic~'ntal:rrv arr uut ~~'illing tu cuuprratr am'ntore. In the uext
tLrurem ~~'r ~~ill ))ru~r f~rrt tltat tllr I)uiut in thr urgutiation arra which }irlds Lhe largest
clr~rrr ul fu111'rl'orit,'r I~ lllr tlull-~'UUt~,ri'i,ll~'r tltl'rAt t)Olnt .` ~.
Theorem 2.3 IJ .~ C ti Nrt rr thc poinl iu thc rrrgoliatinrr arfa .`~, rcprr.~Fttted by a.r E L~.
J~t' Ira,r,~rr C'I.r) --,- rqunl.. ~"'.
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Proof. .~ccunliug tu Thrurrni 1.'?., ( is the set uf Paretu solutions ~t~hich represents a
oatne uf .``~ f 1 pla~'ers. ~~'hrrr each },la~-er miuiniizes the objecti~e function representecl by.
J, for pla}'er i, 1 i- 1. .... ~~ ) aucl (' fur l,la~~er .~~ ~- I. Suppose that .r E(~ ~~ields a point
in the negotiatiun area ~~ ~t'hich uot equals .~'` but for which ('(.r) - ~". Since r yields a
},oint (J~(.r)....,J1~(.r)) in the nrgutiatiun area it sati~fies the property that J;(r) G.I,~.
Because .r ~~ields a}iuint ~ehich nut coiucicles a~ith .`'` there is an i E 1,...,.~' for ~ti~hich
J,I.rI C J;~. llaking ,r~e uf the special pro}~erties of ~' ancl the assumption .V C.5', it is
uu~e al~ca~s pus,iLle tu take a liuiut uu tl,e buunclar~ of .`, rrprrseutecl 6}~ a y E(, for
~~~hich Jt(y) - J~(r).....J,(y) -.I;~~.....J,~(rl) - J,v(.r). The fact that .r and y both belong
tu the set uf the Paretu optimal solutious uf the extenrled gantr ~ields that C(y) C C(r).
Tl,is fact. ho~t'e~'er, ~iulates tl,r a„uml,tiou that C(.r) - ~'. O
It is important tu in~lir ate herr that the nuu-ruuperati~e stratrg}~ which results in the point
~~` E.ti' iu geueral ditfer. fruni the cuul,erati~r strategy ~chich results in the point .V`. In
geueral, the con~~ergeucr uut,~unie uf tóe uuu-couperatice strateg~. and the cooperative
stra[eg~. ~~.ill ~liffer iu the srn~e that thr ruu~-rrgeuce ~al,re fur the cooperative strategy
will be lower thau tl,r cuu~er,r;eure c.alne 1i,r the nun-cuoperative strategy. So, the gains in
con~.ergeuce polic~~inakers n~ill rerri~r I,~ pla} in,G couperati~~el~ will be at most ?' -C(r,v~ ),
~~~here r,~.. represents tl,r non-rool,erati~r strateg~. n~hich ~~ields .~'`. Thus, in general.
Pareto sulutiuus ~~ill uut ~ielrl uia~imal cun~~ergeucr. Therefore. if }~olicyuiakers want a
certain de~ree uf ron~eroenre. it will nsuall}' nut be possihle to keep up with the Pareto
riptimal ~olutiuns. l'.rfnll Paretu sul,rtions will unl~ cuincicle with solutions ~~-ith a certain
de~ree of cun~~er;euce. sa~~ ;. if h f1 ~- (1 P~ 0. ~ote. firrthennore, that the price to be
pa~e~i for re.,rhiu~ r-uu~er,~eurr uf ~, crrtaiu rlreree ~~ill nut be the same fur e~~er~. countrt-.
~'`'e ~~~ill illustr,tr thiti iu au esantplr iu tl,e nrxt sectiuu.
3 An illustrative example
~l~e cunsider n Il,eureti,~ r~antl,le iu ~, (rli~r-rrtr tiuie) rleterrnini~tir linear quaclratic cliffer-
eure ga,ne framr'~~url: ~cith tccu l,l.r~'rr. Iru„nU~ir.). Thr rl~~namir hrha~'iours of pla~'er 1
aud t,la~'er 'l are rlr,r~ril,~il I,~:
!h ( l l- y~ l t- l ~~ u~ l l)- U.:3ry.( 1- I). !h(ll) - l.
!l:(1)-!Izlt-Ilfu~(!I-r0.(irl,l.~-1). !lz(U)-0.
where. for i- 1.~~. y,lt) E 0{ i~ rhe t~u~or't ~arial,le aud u,(t) c ff~ is the instrumental
~~ariable. From the intrractiou terms (U.3y;(f - l 1 for l,ln~~er I and 0.(iy~(t - 1) for pla~~er 2)
fullo~~~s that each pla~~er fares a ~lifferent ~I~~u~rniical strnct,irr. Pln~~er ~? is tnore inHuenced
h~ },lay'er 1 than ~irr ~e,:,a. Each I~la}er nial:rs his ~,laus for thN futnre. ~',e assume that
each pla~er has a plauuing }ieriocl uf 1 auil ~-hoose, his clesirril paths for the future, as
io
follu~~ ~:
I,la~rr I: i~i(1) -'-'~ Ji(''1 -:3,I~.~irrcl I,ath~
},la~~rr'': Ji(}) - I.:i. ~~!('~) - 3.
Tltrse riesirrcl I,atl,~ rrtirc t t hr pulíc ~ ntakrrs o~~ n~ci.~hrs of thr future aud arr obtained
independentll fruut rarl~ uthc~r. In this rxantl,le the I,la~rrs h~t~r difirrrut preferences but,
ati cau be srru frum thr i,lral l,aths. I,uth lila~rrs are stri~~iug fur con~ergence of their target
~ariaLles iu prriocl ~'. It is uf ruursr uu[ urcrssan- to choose cle,ired paths wich cou~~erge
Lut b} doing so ~cr ~cíll hr ahlr to dentonstrate the fact tltat Pareto optimal solutions do
not roincide ~cith con~rr~rncr sul,ttiotts, rvrn if polic}~makers st.ri~~r for cou~.ergence in their
clesired ~alue,. ~1'r rr~,rr.rut tl,r cuafunctiuns Jt,J1 for ever}~ iudi~~idual pla}~er 6}~:
.l, - u :,ffyti l) - ~')` ~- (!h(~') -:3)~ f tr,(1)~~ f tt,('?)~),
J: - U.:~tl!~~Í I)- l..i)' f (I~z(~~) -:3}~~ t tiz( 1)~ f uz('?)~).
Each pla~rr ~cant. tu I,la~ a aratr~~, chning his planuiug prriucl. ~chich miuimizes his costs.
tio the routrul },ruLlrn, fur rvrr~~ iucli~~iclual pla}~rr (i - 1,2) is:
niin .1,.
~~,ttt.,.,11)
Brcausr thr tarort ~,,ri~cLlr faud inclirrrtl~ tl,r iusunmeutal ~ariable) of each pla}er is
~lirrctl~ rrlatr~l tu thu~r „f thr uthrr I,I~c~rr, tl,r rontrul },rol,lrtn uf rach pla~rr drprnds on
tLr actiun. ,ttt,lrrt;,kru L~ tlir utl,rr ~,I.,~rr. Tliis oi~r. ri.r tu ~ariun, ,ulutiun roncrpts.
From thr nun-cuc~l,rr~,ti~~r ~uli,tiun, ~~r ~cill j,,.tit cun~iclrr thr upru luu}~ ~ash solution,
~cl,ich ~cr ciruutr In .`' .~1 hr ruul,rr.,tí~'r .ulntiun~ arr rrl,rr,rutrcl h~ the srt of Pareto
sulutions ~~~I,ich rau hc~ fuun~l I,~ .ul~in~:
miu r,.h (1-~)Jl.
tot' c~ E ~~.1~. ~~'l,rt'r ,c :- (ut(1).ut('~).u!(1),ul(2)).
Hu~cr~rr. hrfurr l~ln~~ine thr ~amr Luth pla~~rrti ccant tu hr c,trr that there ~~-ill he sotue
clr};rrr uf cun~~rr~~~nr,, „f t lirir t~,rort ~~~rial,lr.. In tlti~ rstunplr ~cr aaiunr that both },la~ers
~~~u,t t~ ~„n~rr~r t„ ii,c~ .,~rr.,,r uf ihrir ttu~rt ~arial,lr.. ~1c~ takr ati a utra,urr for the
,lr~rrr uf rui,~er'rnrc. thr ti,llu~citi~ cun~rrorucr fttuctiuu:
~~-~~~IhÍI)-~IÍI))~t i( 'J,(~~)-J('~))~.
~-,
~~hrrr i~t~l :- Il.:í(r~t(II - ~~,(f)) fur 1- 1,~~. So. I,utlt pla~~rrs aorrr tltat they ~~~ant to
ntinintizr tltr ~arianrr c,f thrir tarort ~ariaLlr. itt rarh prriod. ` loreo~rr, miuimizin; the
~ariaucr in I,rriu,l ' i~ ~i~ru nwrr ~~rioht thau minintiziug thr ~.ariancr in period l. ~~hich
is reprrsentrci I,~~ tl,r ~~rieht~ uf I in I,rriucl l an~l -! in l,rriocl '?. Tltrse ~~~ei,ghts iudicate that
butó pla~rr~ hu~l it m„rr int~,urtaut tl,:ct tl,rrr is cutnrrgrucr at tltr rucl uf the planning
prt'iud thau cl,triu~ tlir t,l.,t,nit,o f,rriu,l.
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`u~~, tu~rtl,rr. tl,r ~,la~rrs ha~r tu takr a clrrisiou al,unt the stratrg~' the}' arr going to
fullu~~'. In ureler tu rhuu.r a stra[r~~' thr~' hace tu ~criglt out all pussible strategies. So,
ultintatel}' thr~ ha~r tu tiuít a~tratr~~' ~ehicl, is "ut,tintal'~ iu sume srnse. In the next
sub~ectiuu ~cr rlrnwnsuatr thr sulutiuu cuncrpts cle~rlut~rcl in section '~ and analy'ze the
st~acr uf iut.rrrstiuQ untruntrs. :~ftrr that ~~~r gicr uur l,ussil,lr iutrrprrtation of "optitnal"
and ~i~'r a prutio;al tu clrtrrminr a frasil,lr clr~rre of cuu~'rrgrucr, -~, for both pla~'ers.
3.1 Analysis of the possible outcomes
.~~ ~trrar,l iu .r, tiun ''. tltr ,Ircision abunt ~~'hat stratr~~. to follo~c. ~cill depentl upon the
fullu~t'in~ srt:
{(.l,(tc).J~z(tc).('(rc)) ~ t~ E ffi~} (-1)
Brcause Jt.JZ,C' arr ~trictl~' cuu~'r~ fnnctiuns n.hich are t~~~icr cíiffrrrntiable in u, the set
I can be found b}~ sul~~iug thr fullu~~.in~ prol,lrnt:
Lrt c,. ,1 E[0, l]. ancl
J(ul:-(1 -.~)(o.l, f(t -~).I2)fa(~.
Fiud uu~c fur r~rrt n..` E [U. 1]:
„' :- aro inin.l(u)
Frum ~rctiun '?. tl,r .rt uf runtrul ~tratr;ir. 1 is gi~'ru h~':
{u"I,~.,~) I (n.,~) E [O.l] x (U, l]}
5ubstitutiug thr,r runtrul aratr~irs iu (~) ;i~r, thr t~,llu~~'ine: srt ( cuntparr ~í'ith (:3)):
{f.lijr~,.,1)..h(n..1).('to.,~)Í I ln.,~j E [0.1] x [0.1]}.
lu thr seynrl ~ír ~~ifl aual~'sr this srt uf t,uit,ts fur thr ~i~rn r`atnt,lr.
Remark. ('unipntiu~ tl,r u,ttruntr~ fur .1 - I. n- U. n- l oi~'rs ,ome clifficulties brcause
iu that rasr ~cr hsc~'r a ~inonlar ~~'~trnt uf rctnatiuns. Ho~cr~'rr. ~~'r are not particularl~'
interestrcl in thusr ~ituatiuns su ~~'r ,t.rcl in unr calc,tlatious ~'alitrs ~tiltich are close to these
t~uints.
~ prujrrtiuu uC tV,r "ufacr iu (:,), un ilir .It.Jt-plaur is clra~~'n ín ti;ure ?. This set of
t,oint5 is ,Iruotr,l h~ ti. lil:r in .rctiuu '~.
ti-{tJt(ct.,~)..h(ci.a)1 ~(n.a) E[O.l] x,0. f]}








0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 Jt
FiQure ~?: The parantetrize~l area ti', tlte nwst left cur~'r represents the pareto solutions P,
the small trianolr un tLi~ f~l[r~'Y I'e3)re5ents tltr nrgotiatiuu area .`'.
.ulntion~. ~~~I,i,~li i~~ ~,i~~ru L~ tltr Irft I,Is,rl: lin,~. It is ul,tainecl l,~' cumputiug for ~'arious n:
P-{(.h(ci.Ul..l~ln.Ul) Í c, E[0. 1]}
Puints uu thr~ ul,l,,,, ~~,,rt uf tl,e Parrtu linr rurrr,pun,i ~cith a lti~h ~"alue of a and points
uu thr lu~~"er ~,art tu ., Iu~t' ~'aI„r uf n. f I,t' e,l~t' L~ iu fig,trr~'? is ul,taiuecl In' contputing for
~'ario,.is ,~ E(U. 1 J: I.l~ i I.,~ I. J:( I.,1l) ~,n,l th,~ r,l~e L, I,i ,~umf,nting for ~'arious a E[0, 1]:
(.hiU.,l).JztU..~ii. TI„~ r,l~r in tli,~ tie-i,re ~~'hich rorre~pun,l~ to (Jt(a,l).,7z(n.l)) for
a E(0. 1] i~ rr~rlnr,',l t„ „u~' ~,uint it, tl,r ti~,nr'. ~~'r ,Iruuteil tl,i~ point b}' L.3. The small
triauale un tht~ P.u,'tu linr ,I,'uut,-. tl,e tieoutiatiuu area .`' as ~la~tined in ~ection 2. `ote
tflit[ tlle nt'i~utlatlui, :,I~r;t "`~ I~ ,'utll~,lt'Ir'I`' rU~",'Ic',I l,1' ti,
Tu aet an i,lra uf tl,t' ,It'srf'a' uI run~'rr~rnrr In e~'r~r~' 3iuiut uf tht' srt in (:3) ~~'P 3,lotted figure
:f. Tltis tio,n't' sltu~~'. ,, tLrt't~ ,liineu.iunal ~,lut uf the fi,llu~~"iu~ s~u'far~r:
{~'(~,. ~) i(t,.a~ E(o. f] X[o, f]}
`ote that tl,e puints ~c'Itrre ,~ - 0 o'i~'e tl,r ~Ie;ree of ruu~'rrp;enre for the Pareto solutions.
.~. can be ~een iu tl,r fi;,u'e. poiuts ou tlte Paretu liue ~~'herr a alntost equals 1 or 0,
oi~'e a ~'er~' liiglt C' ~"alut.. ~ehicl, inelicates that in thosr poiuts tlte degree of convergence
is ratlter ~tnall. `lurru~"t'r wr markril in tltis tigurr tlie 3~oint ~~'itlt tlte largest clegree of
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Figure :3: .~ three dimensional plot, where for each R, a E[0, 1] x[0, 1] the corresponding




:~'` O.:íO:i 0.:370 0.1059 O.OrO 0.2i0
,4 0.~3~) i 0.:370 O.l 1:ï3 O.G'lí~ 0
B O.iiO:í 0.:3:í9 0.1-1b:3 O.:i'?3 0
D 0.47'! Q~:ïl 0.089G O.b:36 0
Nou-('uoperation
:1'~ O.aO~i 0.:3ï0 O.1:3G5 - -
TaLle l: Characteristics of some interestiug points.
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convergence on the Parrto line. It is deuoted by D and it corresponds with a- 0.836.
In table 1 the correspouding (Jt,J.1,C) of point D is giveu. Moving away from the
Pareto line, by increasiug a just a little bit, we see that the degree of convergence increases
also. This means that if the players choose an outcome outside the Pareto line P their
costs will increase but in return for these increasing costs the value of the convergence
function will decreasr, wltich tueaus niore couvergeucP. In this example, if a increases to
1, the convergence functiou wíll go to 0, which means complete couvergence (in period 1







0.49 0.495 0.5 0.505 0.51 0.515 t
Figure k: Zoomiug in ou figure '? arouud the uegotiation area. Iso-convergence lines are
draw n.
Specific inforniatiou ahout the points .4, B, aud N'` can he foiuid in table 1. In table 1
the cooperative outconte ~'` correspouds with a strategy which yields a lower convergence
value than the non-couprrative uutcomr .~'~. The reasou for this is that the non-cooperative
strategy differs from thr coopPrative strategy. Playiug the cooperative strategy gives, with
the same individual rusts, an incrrase iu cuuvrrgeuce of 0.306! In figure 4 we draw some
iso-couvergence liurs, as detiued in sertiun Y. [n the figure for eaclt iso-convergence line the
corresponding convergeuce value is givrn. Tlte degree of couvergeuce on the Pareto line
increases from B to .4. .~s proven in section 2 and visible iu the figure, the point with the
largest degree of couvergPnce iu thr uPgotiation area lies ou the edge of the negotiation
area and is exacth. thP :`'` point which belongs to the iso-couvergence line lo.toss. So, the
ry', as defined in sectiou ?, equals 0.10.59.
15
Zooming in on flgure 3, from a diffrrent viPwpoint, we get au iudication of which values
of a, a belong to thP negotiation area .N, which is drawn on the surface in figure 5. The
corresponding a, ~-values for .4, B, and .N` are giveu in table 1.
0.4
Figure .~: Zooming iu on figure 3 aronud thr negotiation arPa (0.05 C ct C 0.65) and
(0 C~ G 0.-1). The cur~'e on the back ( a-0) represents a subset of the Pareto solutions P.
The interior of the ctu't'e elra~ti~u on thr surfacr represents the negotiation area :~'.
3.2 Fixing the degree of convergence
In this subsectiou we ,issume that buth players agree they want a degree of convergence of
at least ~. So, the placers will play~ a sh'atPgy wóich results iu a point ia (4) which belongs
to the ISO-COn~'ergPn~ P liue l,. In figurr~ 6 we liave drawn for three different values of ~
the convergence valuPS for all c~ E(0, l~. Ou the one hand it gives an indication of how
quickly convergence ~Ircliues wlieu increasiug ~, aud on thP other hand it illustrates how
the convergence depends on a for constaut ~. Agaiu, a- 0 corresponds with the Pareto
16
optimal strategies. 1lurecrvrr, in fig~irr G fuur differrnt levels for 7 are drawn. Each level
distiuguishes a group uf solutious with cliffereut proprrties which we will analyze below.
C
o.z o.a 0.6 0.8 a
Figure 6: For various a, aud varying ~ E[0, I~ the correspouding convergence outcome is
plotted.
(a) 7 C O.Ob96
Both players play a stratrgy wlrich rrsults in a point ou the iso-convrrgence line L,. However
(see fïgure 4). for this ~, I, n P - 0, aud l, n:V - 0, which implies that the chosen strategy
is uot a Pareto uptimal strateg~~ aud that the correspondiug (J,, J.2) point falls outside the
negotiation arra. Su, at Iraa uur uf thr playrrs will havr iiighrr costs thau when he plays
the nun-cooperati~~e upeu loup `ash stratrgy. Such au ambitious setting of the degree of
convergence is very unrealistic, it means that convrrgencr prevails over individual costs.
Therefore we rxcludrd this possibility iu section 2 by our assumption of rational behaviour.
(b) O.Ob96 c 7 c O.IO~i9
For this 7(seP fi gi.irr ~}), l, n iV - 0, hut ly n P~ 0. So, a strategy can be played
w~hich coincides ~cith thr Paretu optimal stratrgies. From figure 6 follows that there are
two possible Paretu uptimal stratrgies, which correspuuds in both cases wih an a) 0.625.
Su player 1 will have highrr custs thau whru he plays the opeu loop tiash strategy. On
the other haud. playing one of thr tw~u ParPto optimal solutions will be very profitable for
player 1. ~Vithout au~ uther adclitional agrrements between the players (see (a)), player 2
will never accept such an outcome.
(c) 0.1059 C 7 C 0.1'~:í8
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In this case, l, n a' ~ 0, and l, n P~ 0, but 1, n N n P- 0. If the players decide to
play a Pareto optimal strategy, player 2 will again have higher costs than when playing the
open loop tiash strategy. IL1ore likely is au outcome within the negotiation area N. For
instance if the players agree on a ry- 0.1104 then they have to find a point in lo.[[oa n N.
Looking again at figure -1, we see that there is a whole rauge of possible outcomes. A
unique outcome may be obtaiued using bargaining theory ( 7, 9]. As already can be seen
in figure 4, any outcome uf such a game will be that player '2 does not gain much in a
bargaining situatiou whereas the gains for player 1 cau be cousiderable.
(d)0.1258~-y
Now, L, n N n P~ 0, which means an outcome can be played on the Pareto line between
A. B. Also here, bargainiug theory cau be applied to select a unique outcome.
Concluding we see that if tl[e deslTed degree of couvergence is set too high the players
have to pay a price for that and cau uot obtaiu Pareto optimal solutions. Furthermore,
if they can not obtain solutious within the uegotiation area the player(s) will have an
incentive to deviate towards the threatpoint aud forget about any degree of convergence
at all. Moreover, we observe that iu almost all cases player 1 cau gain more than player
2. In the figures this depends on the shape of the iso-convergence lines and ultimately is
traced back to the fact that player 1 has tnore influence ou player 2 than vice versa.
3.3 An approach to determine a reliable degree of convergence
In this sectiou we preseut au algorithut to determine a feasible degree of ry. The previ-
ous subsection states that. without any other agreements between the players, a degree of
convergence which has uo co['respoudeuding outconte iu thP uegotiation area is unlikely to
happen. The questiou remaius, howevPr, which degree of couvergeuce within this negoti-
ation area ultimately will be selected by the players. lu fact without making any further
assumptions ou the urgotiatiou process, every point in the negotiatiou area is possible.
One way to come to a wtique point within the uegotiatiou area is by axiomatiZing the
uegotiation game. ~~e shall uot elaborate this subject here, since for the moment we are
more interested in qualitative rather thau quantitative statemeuts. All we will do is sketch
how a feasible degree of -y can be determiued, using some heuristic arguments. First we
will give an example and theu we will present two algorithms which illustrate the approach
in general.
In figure ï the convergence value is plotted against the costs of player 1, along the line
A to N`, where the costs of player '~ remaiu constant. Starting at point A and moving
towards a'`, the convPrgence value declíues rapidly. This continues untill the point where
(Jt,C) -(0.498ï,0.1098). After that point the derivative of the slope of the curve gets
larger than - 1. In figure ï we denoted this poiot by E. From that point on, towards N`,
the costs increase more rapidly than the degree of convergence. If player 1 has to choose an
is
c
Figure 7: For the edge of the uegotiation area, from A to ,ti", the convergence value is
piotted. Poiut E is the point where the derivative of the taugent of the curve is -1.
outcome on the liue in figure ï, 6P will start iu point A wherP his costs are minimal. From
thereon, if player 1 wauts to increase convPrgeuce, he will have to weigh out costs against
convergeuce. For instancP, if player 1 starts iu A and moves towards ~" and accepts only
points where the slope vC~dJ~ G-1, the rPSUIt will be the outcome E.
The general idea expressed iu tlie above example is that players accept an increase in con-
vergence otily if the rorrespouiling costs stay withiu a prespecified region. So, a sketch of
a numerical approach for detenniuing a fPasible dPgree of ry would be the following:
(1) Start frotn a poiut (J~,J~~) on the Paretu line between A,B. It seems reasonable to
start at a bargainiug uutcoine [ ï, 9].
(2) Deternune the directiou c' -( i'~, e~l), for wbich there is a t~ 0 for which (Ji. J2)tt(v~, vz)
E:V, and couvergencr inrreases ~uaxiinal.
(3) Choose a smal] t~ 0.
(~) Calculate x~ - -8C'~i~u. Check if tjJ,w2~ G y,(~~), for i- 1.'? where ,Y;(X~), i- 1,2
are (decreasing) fuuctions of ~~ which iudicate the wPight players want to assign to the
tradeoff between convergence and costs. That is, if the additioual increase in convergence
(refiected by a smaller value for C) equals ~~ then the additional increase in costs for each
player seperately should be less than ~,(~~) for i- 1.1.
(5) If (4) holds then i.ise this new point as a starting point aud start again in (2). Stop, if
no point in a' can be found for w'hich (2) and (4) hold.
A drawback of this approach is that it is timeconsunvug, even for small models. The rea-
son is that the functious J~, J.Z, C are parametrized in a aud ~ and therefore calculating
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~~itnl,lr luul:iu~,~~ ,'~f~l~'~~i„1,~ lil:,' rl('; ~l,
.~lrl, I~~ I. Ixi;r a lut uf t I IIH'.
,r il.l,~ r11' Gn i- 1. ~'. ur fiu,litl~ a,lirrctiou t' in
` ouucl altrruaticr ~clii~ l, i~ ~trull~l~' n'I;,tr,l ~citll tllr f,re~'iuttn al~urithm. but is easier to
c~ulnlntte. i, tllr fullutcill~ ;,lauritllut:
(1 I ytart iu ~untr it';uiLlr l,uint I~rt~crru .-t. B. 11'itll tlli~ l,uint tllrre corrrsponds an
lu,iqltrl~' rlrterntinr,l r~.
I?) Fi~ n.
Ial lu~r,~;t~r .` frun, 11 tu 1 l,~' Il:iuo a~trf,~izr uf, i~,r iu~tanrr. U.III. ('Iter'k if thr point
~t~r~; iu tl,,' tlr,uti;,ti„u ;nr;, .`
I~j ('het-k ii,r r~~rr~~ ,~ ,':li,'iLrr -iJ('Irl.~ ~ iJ.ll~r),~ anrl -~iC~~~r)~ 1 rl.l.~r1~.
l:,l titul, if ur, ,` r,ul L~' f„~In~l fur ,cllirll IaI ;ul,l I i) Ilul,l~.
Thr r-unilitiul,~ iu ~r,'f, i~l l ut tllr' ;,1~-utitllnl r;~u I,r runlf~arrrl ~citlt tltr cuuclitious iu step
I 31 uf tllr f,rr,~iult~ ;~Icuritlltn. TI~,'~r' ~'uu,liti„I1~ ~t;,tr that if for ra,-lI pla~rr sel~eratelt'
cu~t~ risr Ir... tLau ruu,rr~ru, r' f.,ll~ ,~ I,r'u ,1 iurrra~r. L~ uur ,ulit Lutll pla~rrs are ~~'illiug
tu accept tnur,~ run~~r~rnru,-r la~ 1u11,- a~ tllr~ an~ ~~ithln lhr nr~utiatiuu area). ~ote tltat
fur ultr rutl~~rl,irn,~t' "~r tuul: ~-~ i -~~. ~~~r ,t.r'rl tllr l:ut al~~uritltm tu rietermitte a
fra~iL]r ulltrunlr' in uln ,'x;,lnf,l,'. :`~ ;, ~t;util,, i,uiut ,~r rlluu~r tllr aziuntatic `ash bar-
~~aiuiua ~ollttíull ( .rr,~.,,. '~. ~Ij~. ~I~IIi~ ~ul~lti,n, ~~urrr~f,uu,l~ „itll ~ - U..ii.i aucl lies ou the
Parrtu rur~r ;,i,f,ru~iln;,tl~ iu tllr nli,l~llr 1~,'ttcrr't, .I ;u„I B. Itl tie~ur ~~ ~cr ha~'e clra~cn for
U c,~ C 1 tllr r~Ir~r~ - il~'~rl,~, rl.llirl.l ~,u~l ilJl~rl.~. TLr fi;nrr ~Itua'~ ~unte iutrresting
faitti. Fir~t uf;rll Ili,' ,„u,litiuu~ uf ~Ir~fl I I1 uf tllr al,uritlun ;ne ~iulatrcl ~cl,ru ,1 ~ 0.'?F.
5r,-onrll~-. ,cllrn inrl~';~~in~, ,1 thr ru~t, uf i,ln~'rr 1 fall! 1-I,i~ laa, till ,1 - 0.-{ ~~'hrre t)Jt~~J,~
-rt~ l,u.iti~r. Ou tllr' „tllrr Il;u„I i,l;,~~rr.' ~~ a,l,litiunal ru~tti fur inrrrasing cutt~'rro~enre are
lin all .~ I,i;l,rr tL;u, tIn';~~l~litiun;tl rua-, f,l;l~~r't' I i~ f;~,rrl ~cítll. I~in;,ll~~ in tï~nre!) ~cr hair
rlrnv,n ;, ~tnall f,;ut „( Illr riu~r:
ii.11,11.~~~-~. `I..l,~ll.:~~:~.,',i! I', E ~,II. IJJ
Tllr r~n~~~r t,'u~l~ 1,~ .t;l~ ~,'r~ rl,,.,' tu t Ilc' P;~n'tu rlu~~~r~ :,n,l rru~.r. t I1,' ne~otiatiuu arra al-
r,~;,~l~~ti,ra~'rr~~nl;~ll.1-II.II-I. i!li~~~~n~r,'~i„~li~l~,citl,;,1.11..1..('I-~11.-1!)~~.O.a~U.U.]l:,lll.
K,'Inarl:;,i,lr' i~ tl~;,t f~la',~'r 1 Itln' ,t1„I1,,'r f,l;,~,'ri I,:~. Ir,~~r'r rua, tl,;ru Ilr ~cu,ll,l ha~e in
tllr' `;,~II I~;,r,;,iuiu'~ ~~~I~Iti„li. ;~ ",I~Itiuu ~',lii~ ll ~cunl,l I,r ;~rrrf,t;,Llr if tl,r l,la~er~ clicl twt
ll'ril'r It, I'rr~l(uIl 1C1[ll ~ill~~ ~~ull~l'f~','il,~r' a~fn',~t~ rll ;fll.
4 Conclusions
lu tlti~ l,al,rr ~cr' l,rr,r'utr'~I a tltrurrtir;ll ;~f~f,ruarll Ilu~c tu rlr;tl ,citl, tllr i..nr of cuu~rr~rnrr
Lr~t,crru E.('. runutri,'~. fi;,,r,l un tll,';,~~Innfniuu lll;,t tllr l,rinlar~' ilttrrra of the ~uttntrirs
i~ ntittintizitt, tl,rir un'u in,li~ i,ln;,l ~~,'ll~,rr' lu.~. ~cr ruu.iclrrecl tllr cfnr~tiou ltu~c rooperati~e
~tratr,ie~ ~irl,litie m:t~inl;,l ,utl~'r'r"rur,~ r;ul I,r ~Irtr'rntinec{. ~1-e ~Ilu,~rrl tltat fur a lar~e
zo







-~)('~i1.~, r)J~~rla anrl r).Iz~~J~ are drawn.




Fio,ur ~): titartina ( rutn tlir `,,ai I,~r,tiinin~ sul,ttiuu, fixitia n and slu~~~l~. increasittg ~
~i~r., x,-itnr ~~ltirli trn~l. tu an~ ~rr~ rlu.r tu tlir Pturtu .ul,itiun~.
z)
cla,s uf ~,rublrnl,, i.r. ~,r„I~Iruts ~~rrr thr iucli~'iclllal costfunctions aud convergence function
arr t~~'ice clitfrrrntiaLlr :,ucl iuu~'rx. a par:lmrtrization fur a large set of cooperative strate-
gies can be cir[rrntiur,l. "1-Ilis srt ro~'rrs thr Pareto uptitual sol,ltiuns by~ construction and.
iu general (see notr in ~r, tiuu '~). ~ u~'rrs all the cooprrative strategies ~~-hich improve over
the uon-cooperati~'r wlntiou. [-~sing thiti al,proach a number uf interesting questions can be
cunsiclrrrd. Fur instanrr ~~'hrthrr it is hussihle that for a particular titne hurizou the E.C'.
countries can satisf~' thr cuu~-Prgruce conclitious iu snch a ~~.ay that for every couutry' the
rorresponcling custs arr x,-,rl,tal~lr, anCl Ilo~t' LhesP COSts differ amoug countries. [n section
three ~~'e showed iu a.ilnl,lr thc~orrtical exanlplr ho~~' to analy-ze such questions. The next
step shoulcl br tu usr ihr .amr appruac-h un mure rralistic dy'namic (macro)econometric
countn~ moclels. ur j,lst un a l,art uf thrtir moelrls ~~.6rrr the iuteraction betweeu countries
is most es.rutiaL r.~. tl,r nlunrtar~' ~r,'tur. lu clraliu~ with that prublrm countries should
realize that
(1) it must I,ie clear whrrr unr ,hulllcl ruu~'rrge tu [S]. Should they- converge to the lowest,
the highest or thr a~'rreor rntrs uf thrir targrt~iustrnmental cariahles? In our approach
this means that cu,ultrirs ~Iloi11,1 a~rrr uu a cutuntou cunvPrgence function C}.
('?) the preferencr, uf rulultrirs shuul(I hr fiuetuned ou eacó other. [t is clear that if these
preferences cliffer struu,l~' amun~ cutlntrirs, convPrgPUCe will bP a~'ery tough issue. In
the cly'naniical ~anl(' :Ipl,tvarh tllis ,-an I,r aual~'sed with the clesireci paths aud choice uf
~~eights fur thr tarart~iuarnnlrutal ~'arial,lrs ~:,~. Thr theorPtical example was chosen in
;uch a~~'a~' that iu tl,r I~,~t l,rriucl uf thr planuing hurizou the countries, at least, strive
fur con~'ergPU,r. ~~'hirl, i~':,~ iml,lrnlrutrcl L~ róoosiug rqual ~'aluPS for the corresponding
(lesired paths.
(3) the tilue-horizuu. nrrr.~:u'~' fur rrarllillg the ron~'rtgeuce cou(litions within a limited
period, pla~s a c-rnrial n,lr tuu. TLi. a..i,r,-t is ~u'onRly' relatecl to tlle (letennination of the
cle;ree uf ,'ull~'rl'orn,'r. `~r r~l,rrt Ih:,[ fur a~Ilurt planuing prrio(1 thr costs for couvergence
can be ~er~' cu~tl~ r,tl,l rlli~ ma~ ~Iltinlatrl~ rr.ult in uou-cuoprrati~'r beha~'iour of SOil]P
cuuutrirs. Thi. "Ihjr, t rrnlailiti. hu~~~r~rr. a tupic fur f,lttlrr resrarch.
(-1) costs for run~'rr~rurr ,lilfrr :,Inuit, ~'uinitrirs. Tllr rzamplP in the paprr gi~'es a~t-at~ ltow
tu cleterluiur tllr~r ~„~t. C„r :ui~' oi~ru ,Ir~rrr uf cuu~'rr~rucr. in grurral tliPSe differencrs
will clepeu(I ou tllr r~„u„n,ir:,l ~trn,tnrrs uf thr participating countrirs. The theoretical
rxatnple ~i~PS alrra,lc :u~ iu,liratiuu that tltrsr custs I'olll,l br mnch Iligher for countrirs
which ha~'r IPSS iutl,lru,-r iu tllr ('uuuunnit~'.
The approach rlr.ionr,l lirrr for ailnl~'sili~ cun~'ergrnce cau bP usrcl for Inany' other prob-
letns as ~~'ell. If pl:,y'rr~ iu a,I~ u:,nlir o:,mr 6a~'r conunun objrcti~'rs, apart frotn their usual
costftmctiuns, thr a~,l,rua, h,'all Lr n.rcl a~ lun; aS N'P tal:r tlclCe (hffPCPntIablP coll~'PX fnnC-
tiuus. lf wr sta~ in :, nnllt iruuutr~' .rttiu~, cunlmon ul,jrcti~'rs apf,rar iu r.g. eu~'irunmeutal
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